European Regional Science Association
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European Regional Science Association
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The abstract for paper number 331:
Isabelle Leroux, LEREPS - Université Toulouse 1, Toulouse, France, Alain Berro, CERISS-IRIT, Université Toulouse 1, Toulouse, France
Negotiation and power in territory analysis. An artificial life simulation applied to biotechnology activities in Toulouse
Our purpose, in this contribution, is to bring to light that negotiation and power conflicts are at stake in coordinations structuration within territory, more particularly here in the case of biotechnology activities. We base this contribution on Artificial Life simulations of negotiation games (Arthur W.B., Durlauf S.N., Lane D., 1997).
If spatial and industrial economics theorical models, such as industrial districts, milieu, or learning regions propose a large analysis of differentiated coordination mecanisms, it however not really takes into account dynamics of negotiation and power which can explain the diversity of these coordinations. In this perspective, we propose in this contribution an analysis of these coordination structurations, which set up "a territory of biotechnologies" in Toulouse. These coordinations are indeed based on negotiation, as they involve various actors such as phamaceutical industry, start-up, local communities, local research laboratories, whose vested interests and power strategies may not prove conciliable. These actors strategies are caracterised on the one hand by scientific appropriation conflicts, and on the other hand by public business assets captation conflicts. In this perspective, how negotiation is beeing at stake in these conflicts solving and coordinations structuration?
1 – On a methodologic point of view, we propose Artificial Life simulations of negotiation, inspired from the T. Ellingsen (1997) bargaining evolutionnary game. As an heuristic result, our simulations show that negotiation lead to an agreement which is not a perfect share, or an "universal" rules, but a compromise frequently hiding complex mecanisms of domination and concession. The main contribution of these simulations, which are based on genetic algorithms, is to put in a prominent position the variations of behavioral rules. We show how negotiation is an evolving process based on domination and concession behaviors (influence, coercion, T. Schelling (1960) "power of the weak") which once vary. This result bring to the fore the question of flexibility and phasing dynamics of power behaviors in bargaining.
2 – The application of these heuristic simulations to biotechnology activities in Toulouse contributes to bring to light that coordinations involving pharmaceutical industry, local communities and local research laboratories are based on direct or indirect evolving domination and concession negotiation games. If industrial firms play "the power of the weak" game, making concession of their decision power to public research laboratories, they endeavour systematically to exerce an influence or a discrimination power, by using hided and indirect means that forward by local communities.
Unfortunately full paper has not been submitted.