![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
The abstract for paper number 326:
Marco Alderighi, IEP and CERTeT, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy, Ugo Fratesi, IEP and CERTeT
Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy
Trans-national networks, regional infrastructure and the dynamics of competitive advantages
We address the issue of the optimal investment policy in infrastructure for competing regions and nations, focusing on the well known distinction between local and international infrastructure.
First, we will investigate the historical development of these types of infrastructure at different scales and see what pattern it did follow, paying attention to the characteristics of the local authorities investing and the governance relations between them (competition, co-operation or political union).
Then, using a dynamic extension of the framework developed by Martin and Rogers (JIE, 1995) in a game theory context, we will identify the optimal strategies for local authorities depending on the size, economic wealth and dynamic economic perspectives of regions and to compare the present and predicted behaviour. In addition to this, we will be able to determine the outcome in terms of regional disparities.
This study will finally provide new insights on the optimal level of investment in international infrastructure and the cases in which co-operation needs a credible threat of punishment in order to be implemented.
Unfortunately full paper has not been submitted.