Gender Role Beliefs and Family Migration Decision-Making

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A large volume of empirical evidence demonstrates that women are harmed by family migration but that these effects are likely related to gender role beliefs in ways that are not consistent with economic theory. However, direct evidence as to how gender role beliefs affect family migration is limited to three dated empirical studies. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that all of the empirical evidence points toward gender role beliefs as the key variable shaping family migration outcomes but with limited empirical evidence to support the conclusion. This research seeks to determine if the accepted explanation for the trailing wife effect is indeed true by constructing measures of the gender role beliefs of husbands and wives and determining their effect on the migration decision. Using data from the National Survey of Families and Households, models of migration are estimated as a function of family gender role beliefs and the wife's employment situation. The employment situation of the wife has a great influence on the migration behavior of couples who share progressive gender role beliefs. For example, when a wife in a progressive family is unemployed but wants to work there is a 26% chance that the family will move over the course of the next several years. In contrast, the employment situation of the wife has no effect on the migration behavior of couples who do not have strong progressive gender role beliefs. Indeed, when a wife in a non-progressive family is unemployed but wants to work there is only a 7% chance that the family will move. This is the first study to find direct evidence linking gender role beliefs to the trailing wife effect.

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Introduction

The biblical story of Ruth concerns a woman who marries an immigrant. When he dies, her mother in-law plans on returning home, and urges Ruth to stay with her family-of-origin. Ruth replies: "Where you go I will go, and where you stay I will stay. Your people will be my people and your God my God. Where you die I will die, and there I will be buried. May the Lord deal with me, be it ever so severely, if anything but death separates you and me" (The New Revised Standard Version Bible 1989, Ruth 1:16-18). Even though her husband has died, and her mother-in-law is leaving Ruth's place of birth, Ruth feels compelled to abandon her identity, to continue to reside with her husband's family, and to assimilate her family-in-law's culture.

The story of Ruth is an example of the tradition of "patrilocality" - upon marriage the wife moves into the husband's home (which may be his parent's home as well) and follows the husband wherever he moves. While still the norm in many parts of the world, patrilocality is not usually considered in reference to the migration and residential decision making behavior of married women living in more developed countries. Yet, the migration of women in more developed countries shares much in common with this ancient tradition.

For example, the recent film *The Family Man* (Ratner 2000) concerns a Wall Street banker who, through a dream, reconsiders his decision to abandon his fiancée a decade ago. In the dream he finds himself living his alternative (poorer but happier) life with his fiancée in the middle class suburbs of New Jersey. During the dream he has the opportunity to gain the career success he actually has by moving his family to Manhattan. His wife responds:

> Maybe I was being naive, but I believed that we would grow old together in this house, that we'd spend holidays here and have our grandchildren come visit us here. I had this

> image of us all gray and wrinkly, and me . . . working in the garden, and you repainting the deck. But things change. If you need this, Jack, if you really need this, I will take these kids from a life they love, and I'll take myself from the only home we've ever shared together . . . and I'll move wherever you need to go. I'll do that because I love you. I love you, and that's more important to me than my address.

Despite the fact that the wife, in the dream at least, has a law degree, she is apparently just as compelled as Ruth to set aside her own life and those of their children to follow her husband to a new locale.

Contemporary social science research into the 'trailing wife' phenomenon documents that patrilocality is perhaps nearly as common today as in the time of Ruth. A large volume of empirical evidence documents that family migration is most directly influenced by the husband's human capital and demographic characteristics - even if the wife has a greater earning potential - and that family migration generally harms the employment and economic status of the wife - again even if the wife has a greater earning potential than the husband (see Cooke 2003). The human capital model of family migration is the theoretical frame of reference for nearly all of these studies of family migration (see Mincer 1978), despite inconsistencies between the model's predictions and the empirical evidence. Apparently, just as in the stories of *Ruth* and *The Family Man*, the role of gender appears to have a greater impact on family migration behavior than utility-maximization. Yet, despite the fact that the human capital model of family migration offers little insight into the empirical facts and strong evidence that gender is the dominant force shaping family migration behavior, family migration research has yet to place gender front-and-center.

Literature Review

A large body of empirical evidence, most of which has been most recently conducted by geographers (e.g., Bailey, Blake and Cooke 2004; Boyle et al. 2002; Clark and Withers 2002; Cooke and Speirs 2005; Smits, Mulder and Hooimeijer 2003), demonstrates that women are harmed by family migration but that these effects are likely related to gender role beliefs in ways that are not consistent with economic theory. However, direct evidence as to how gender role beliefs affect family migration is limited to three dated empirical studies. Indeed, two of these papers are quite limited in their conclusions and all of them focus entirely on migration intentions and not on migration itself. Markham (1986) used data from a study of six offices in a federal agency based on a survey of 897 employees and supervisors. The purpose of the study was to consider the links between migration and career mobility. The effects of gender role beliefs were discussed only briefly: Women with less traditional gender role attitudes were more willing to move. Bird and Bird (1985) used a sample of 107 dual-earner couples from a 1979 survey to investigate the determinants of willingness to move. Among other things, they found that the importance of the wife's income and job aspirations on the decision to move increased with the adoption of less traditional gender role beliefs by both the husband and the wife.

Bielby and Bielby (1992) offer a much more theoretically and empirically substantial consideration of the role of gender and family migration. Bielby and Bielby (1992:1245) accept the importance of an economic rationale to family migration decision-making which is consistent with the human capital model but argue that this economic calculus is mediated by gender role beliefs: "Neoclassical and social exchange approaches ignore the household roles husbands and wives occupy, the gender-role beliefs they subscribe to regarding those roles, and the effect of

these beliefs on both the process and outcome of couples' decision making."

In particular, Bielby and Bielby (1992) argue that it is the primary earner's gender role beliefs that take precedence: Social exchange theory - which is closely related to neo-classical economic theory - emphasizes how control over marital resources determines power in family decision-making. Financial resources, such as earning ability, are an important family resource. Therefore, a husband with a greater earning ability than his wife has the primary say in a migration decision. If a husband subscribes to traditional gender role beliefs then he is likely to ignore the effect of the move on his wife's employment. Yet, if a husband subscribes to non-traditional gender role beliefs then he is more likely to consider the effect of a move on her well-being. Likewise, when a wife has a greater earning ability than her husband it is her gender role beliefs that shape migration decisions. If she has non-traditional gender role beliefs then she is likely to consider the effect of a move on her husband's employment and well-being. Yet, if she has traditional gender-role beliefs she is likely to ignore the benefit to moving on her own career and well-being and impose upon herself the status of either a tied mover or a tied stayer.

Bielby and Bielby (1992) test their hypothesis using data from a 1977 employment survey to estimate models of reluctance to move because of family considerations. They find that even if a wife has a high-paying job, a husband with traditional gender role beliefs (75% of men in the sample) will not be dissuaded from moving for family considerations if the move promises a "much better job." In contrast, wives with both traditional and non-traditional gender role beliefs will forgo the same opportunity to move for a "much better job," especially if their husbands have high-paying jobs. Therefore, wives are unwilling to consider a move to improve their own career prospects if it means uprooting their families and requiring that their husbands

find new jobs. Yet, husbands are willing to uproot their families and require that their wives find new jobs if it means that their own career prospects will improve.

A very similar area of research that has more fully considered the interplay between the gender role beliefs of husbands and wives, family decision-making, and their labor market activity concerns the relative distribution of household labor among spouses. Although women work more hours in paid labor than in previous generations, there has not been nearly as much adjustment in their hours worked in unpaid labor, especially in comparison to their husbands (Bianchi et al. 2000). Bianchi et al. (2000:194-195) summarize the general conclusions (also see Greenstein 2000):

> Brines (Brines 1994) argues that husbands' housework contributions do not follow "logical" rules of economic exchange. Rather, the more a husband is dependent on his wife economically, the less housework he does, most likely as a way to reassert his masculinity (Brines 1994). . .More egalitarian beliefs about men's and women's roles lead to a more egalitarian division of labor in the home. However, husbands' power is evident – in that wives tend to be affected by husbands' preferences and ideology, more so than vice versa (Ferree 1991; Shelton and John 1996). The interaction between husbands' and wives' ideologies may also be critical, such that husbands who are egalitarian must have egalitarian wives before shifting more energies into the household.

As well, the social constructionist view of gender argues that even when the husband has progressive gender role beliefs, that a wife with strong traditional gender role beliefs will reject non-traditional gender roles as a way of protecting her gender-based identity (Kroska 2002; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Zvonkovic et al. 1996). Alternatively, when the wife has significant economic power or progressive gender role beliefs but is married to a man with very traditional gender role beliefs the husband may not cooperate with her demands to have her economic activity given appropriate weight in the family decision-making.

Carrying this over to migration research further modifies the Bielby hypothesis. In

particular, it is expected that economically "rational" migration decisions will only occur when both the husband and the wife share strong progressive gender role beliefs. In all other cases, the migration decision is expected to be largely dominated by the husband's labor market characteristics with little regard for the wife's labor market characteristics. Thus, the primary focus of this research is to evaluate how gender role beliefs of husbands and wives mediate family migration decisions.

Decades of family migration research have concluded that wives are harmed by migration because of gender-related processes. However, only three quite limited and dated analyses have indirectly considered how gender-related processes contribute to the observed effects of moving on women's economic status. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that all of the empirical evidence points toward gender role beliefs as the key variable shaping family migration outcomes but with limited empirical evidence to support the conclusion. This research seeks to determine if the accepted explanation for the trailing wife effect is indeed true by constructing measures of the gender role beliefs of husbands and wives and determining their effect on the migration decision.

Data and Methods

This research tests the Bielby hypothesis using data from the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) (Sweet, Bumpass and Call 1988; Sweet and Bumpass 1996). The NSFH is a nationally representative three-wave panel study of 13,007 respondents in 1987-88 (Wave 1) and a follow-up interview of 10,007 surviving respondents in 1992-94 (Wave 2). Results from follow-up interviews in 2001-2 (Wave 3) are currently being released. This sample

is uniquely valuable for the research at-hand because it includes detailed data on individuals and their families, includes detailed attitudinal data necessary for constructing measures of gender role beliefs, and provides enough information to construct accurate migration variables.

The analysis is based upon an examination of the determinants of migration between Wave 1 (1987-1988) and Wave 2 (1992-1994). The majority of data are drawn from the Wave 1 sample. Wave 2 data are limited to determining migration behavior and identifying whether families remained intact between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Thus, the sample for this study consists of 2,933 married couple families in which both spouses were continually married to each other from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and for which data there was no missing data. Table 1 defines and describes key variables included in the analysis. Migration ("Mover?") is defined as a change in place of residence from Wave 1 to Wave 2 which involved either crossing a Metropolitan Area boundary or a rural county boundary. Table 1 shows that out of a sample size of 2,933 that 11% of the spouses moved between Wave 1 and Wave 2. A variable classifying families as either "progressive" or "non-progressive" is constructed from the three gender role belief variables listed at the bottom of Table 1.

Table 2 describes how the progressive/non-progressive variable is constructed. A principal components analysis of the three gender role belief questions is conducted separately for husbands and wives. In both cases, the first principal component is highly and positively correlated with each of the three variables and explains about one-half of the total variance in each case. The principal component scores for husbands and wives are then used to create a categorical variable indicating whether *each spouse* subscribes to "progressive" gender role beliefs. If the principal component score is greater than or equal to zero (principal component

scores are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) then the spouse is labeled “progressive” and if the principal component score is less than zero then the spouse is labeled “non-progressive”. Finally, if both the husband and the wife have “progressive” gender role beliefs then the family is labeled as “progressive” and the rest of the families are labeled “non-progressive”. Note that the “non-progressive” category not only includes families where both spouses have traditional gender role beliefs but also families in which one spouse has progressive and the other spouse has traditional gender role beliefs. Of the 2,933 couples in the sample, exactly 1,000 are classified as progressive.

Table 3 presents a more detailed picture of the sample by looking at variable means according to migrant status and household type (progressive/non-progressive). Migrants are more likely to be progressive. Consistent with commonly accepted theoretical and empirical evidence, stayers are more likely to be home-owners, to have school-aged children, to have lower levels of education, to have moved less often in the past, and to be slightly older. None of these differences are unusual or unexpected. Turning to differences between families according to whether they are classified as progressive or non-progressive families, Table 3 indicates that progressive families are slightly more likely to be migrants, to live in a metropolitan area, to be better educated, and to be slightly younger (hence they have more young children). Again, none of these differences appears to be unusual or unexpected.

The modeling strategy for testing the Bielby hypothesis is to estimate probit models of the probability of migrating between Waves 1 and 2 of the NSFH. Apart from typical control variables, the models include a dummy variable identifying whether both spouses adhere to “progressive” gender role beliefs as opposed to “non-progressive” gender role beliefs. This

variable is interacted with various measures of employment. The employment variable, the family gender role beliefs variable, and their interaction determine whether progressive families are more responsive to the employment needs of wives when making migration decisions than non-progressive families, as hypothesized.

Analysis

Table 4 lists the estimates from the first set of probit models of the probability of migrating. The employment status variable indicates whether an individual is employed (those who are not employed are set to zero). Model 1 is limited to the control variable and indicates that migration is negatively and significantly related to owning a home, having a child between the ages of 5 and 17, having at least one spouse who is a minority, and the age of the spouses. Similarly, migration is positively and significantly related to having a previous migration history as a couple and the husband's education level. Model 2 adds the gender role belief variable and the interaction of those beliefs with employment status. There are no meaningful changes to the control variables. Discussion of the significance of the added variables is muddied because of the difficulty in interpreting nested interaction variables.

Table 5 makes the interpretation of the results of Model 2 simpler. Table 5 presents the predicted probability of moving for four types of families based entirely on the parameters of Model 2 in Table 4: 1) progressive families with an employed wife, 2) progressive families with an unemployed wife, 3) non-progressive families with an employed wife, and 4) non-progressive families with an unemployed wife. The predictions are made by holding all variables, except for "Progressive?", "Wife Employed?", and the interaction of these two variables, at their sample

means, and by calculating the probability of moving by varying these last three variables. Thus, row one estimates that the probability of moving for 1) progressive families with an employed wife is 7.4%, 2) progressive families with an unemployed wife is 13.7%, 3) non-progressive families with an employed wife is 9.1%, and 4) non-progressive families with an unemployed wife is 7.2%. Each of these estimates is statistically significant. Thus, it appears as if progressive families are particularly likely to move if the wife is unemployed. Row 2 of the data in Table 5 calculates the statistical significance of the differences in the probability of moving within each type of family. Hence, among progressive families, the probability of moving when there is an employed wife is 6.3% less than when there is an unemployed wife. This difference is statistically significant. Among non-progressive families, there is only a 1.9% difference in the probability of moving due to the employment status of the wife. This difference is not statistically different. Finally, the third row of data estimates the statistical significance of the differences reported in row two: Is the -6.3% difference in the predicated probability of moving within progressive families statistically different from the 1.9% difference within non-progressive families? This difference of 8.2 percentage points is statistically significant.

This first set of models supports the Bielby hypothesis: The employment status of wives influences the migration behavior of progressive families but not of non-progressive families. Indeed, there is an increase of over 6 percentage points in the probability of moving if a wife in a progressive family is unemployed. Left unanswered in these first sets of models is whether the increased level of migration in progressive families with an unemployed wife is due to fewer constraints on moving or in response to the wife's desire to work. The next set of models addresses this question by looking at the interaction between family gender role beliefs and

whether an unemployed wife wants to work.

The logic of Tables 6 and 7 mirrors that of Tables 4 and 5. In this case, however, the employment status variable is replaced by a variable indicating whether a husband or wife is unemployed but wants to work (those who are employed or who are unemployed and do not want to work are set to zero). The results of Table 6 are nearly identical to those of Table 4 and do not merit repeating. The evaluation of these models is again based on the model predictions presented in Table 7. Row one of Table 7 estimates that the probability of moving for 1) progressive families with an unemployed wife who wants to work is 18.3%, 2) all other progressive families is 9.5%, 3) non-progressive families with an unemployed wife who wants to work is 9.4% and 4) all other non-progressive families is 8.4%. Each of these estimates is statistically significant. Again, it appears as if progressive families are not only likely to move if the wife is unemployed but do so in part in an effort to find the wife a job. Row 2 of the data in Table 7 explores the differences in the probability of moving within each type of family. Among progressive families, the probability of moving when there is an unemployed wife who wants to work is 8.9% more than when there is either an unemployed wife who does not want to work or an employed wife. This difference is statistically significant. In non-progressive families there is only a 1.1% difference in the probability of moving when there is an unemployed wife who wants to work versus when there is either an unemployed wife who does not want to work or an employed wife. Finally, the third row of data estimates the statistical significance of the differences reported in row two: The 8.9% difference in the predicated probability of moving within progressive families is statistically different from the 1.1% difference within non-progressive families.

This second set of models also supports the Bielby hypothesis. There is an increase of nearly 9 percentage points in the probability of moving if a wife in a progressive family is unemployed and wants to work. In the final sets of models the influence of both employment status and desire to work are jointly examined by including both variables and their interaction with household type (progressive/non-progressive) into the models.

The parameter estimates of this final set of models are presented in Table 8**.** The signs and significance of the parameter estimates associated with the control variables are nearly similar to what was found in the previous models. Table 9 compares the predictions for the two extreme cases from the parameters of Table 8: The wife is unemployed but wants to work versus when the wife already has a job. Excluded from the analysis is when the wife is unemployed and does not want to work. Here we find that in progressive couples, when the wife is unemployed but wants to work there is a 26% probability of moving. However, when the wife is employed the probability of moving drops to 15%. This 12% difference is statistically significant. In contrast, in traditional couples when the wife is unemployed but wants to work there is only a 7% probability of moving and when the wife is employed there is only a 6% probability of moving. This 1% difference is not statistically significant. The difference in the effect of the wife's employment status on migration between progressive and non-progressive families is marginally statistically significant. Note however, that sample sizes in some of the subcategories are very small and that the results mirror the earlier, more significant results.

The picture that emerges is this: The employment situation of the wife has a great influence on the migration behavior of couples who share progressive gender role beliefs. Indeed, when a wife in a progressive family is unemployed but wants to work there is a 26%

chance that the family will move over the course of the next several years. In contrast, the employment situation of the wife has no effect on the migration behavior of couples who do not have strong progressive gender role beliefs. Indeed, when a wife in a non-progressive family is unemployed but wants to work there is only a 7% chance that the family will move (in contrast to a 26% chance among otherwise similar progressive couples).

Conclusion

This research presents the first solid empirical evidence that gender role beliefs mediate the relationship between women's employment and family migration decisions. To date, only three other papers have investigated how gender role beliefs are related to the intention to move. This is the first that has examined the migration event itself. This analysis quite clearly demonstrates that when a couple shares progressive gender role beliefs that the family has a lower probability of moving when the wife is employed and has a higher probability of moving when the wife is unemployed and wants to work. Among couples that do not share traditional gender role beliefs migration appears to be unaffected by the employment status of the wife.

Thus, this research supports the Bielby hypothesis that the family migration is influenced by the relative resources as well as by relative gender role beliefs. However, there is still asymmetry in the decision-making process. Since traditional gender role beliefs support the "male as breadwinner" and the "female as homemaker roles", a traditional husband with a progressive wife will not be supportive of a move to further her employment needs. Similarly, a traditional wife with a progressive husband will show less desire to move for her employment, even though the husband might support such a move. Thus, "egalitarian" family migration

decisions are likely to be limited to the fewer number of families in which both spouses share very progressive beliefs.

Left unanswered by this research is whether there is a link between the migration decisions of progressive couples and the effect of moving on wives' employment. This project has successfully linked attitudinal ("qualitative") data within a quantitative framework. This approach may likely make such a link difficult to estimate: To find a statistical association between questions about gender role beliefs in time 1 to observations in time 3 (employment status in a destination) that are mediated by migration decisions during time 2 merits careful and sophisticated analysis. However, such an analysis, and indeed the type of analysis conducted within this paper, is worthwhile if for no other reason than it demonstrates that institutionalized differences between "qualitative" and "quantitative" geography can be bridged.

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Table 1: Variables			
Variable Name	**Definition** (unless otherwise noted, variables are codes as 1="yes" and 0="no")	**Mean**	
Mover?	Migrated between Wave 1 and Wave 2: Change in place of residence which involved crossing a county or MSA boundary	11.0%	
Metro?	Resident of an MSA in Wave 1	71.1%	
Own?	Owned a home in Wave 1	77.6%	
Young Child?	Youngest child at home in Wave 1 was less than 5 years of age	32.6%	
Old Child?	Youngest child at home in Wave 1 was 5 years of age or greater	27.5%	
Moved?	Prior to Wave 1, has household ever moved at least 25 miles at least once since marriage began?	38.6%	
Minority?	At least one spouse is White, non-Hispanic	17.0%	
Disability?	At least one household member requires special care	4.6%	
Average Age	Average age of spouses	39.8 years	
Husband College?	Husband has a college degree	26.3%	
Wife College?	Wife has a college degree	10.8%	
Husband Employed?	Husband employed in Wave 1	87.8%	
Wife Employed?	Husband employed in Wave 1	68.0%	
Husband Desires Work?	Husband unemployed in Wave 1, but wants to work	9.2%	
Wife Desires Work?	Husband unemployed in Wave 1, but wants to work	20.3%	
Gender Role Beliefs		**Husband**	**Wife**
Male Primary?	It is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home and family (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree)	2.6	2.8
Children Suffer?	Preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother is employed (1=strongly agree, 5=strongly disagree)	2.6	2.9
Spouses Equal?	If a husband and a wife both work full- time, they should share household tasks equally (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)	4.0	4.3
n		**2,933**	

Table 2: Principal Components Analysis		
	Correlation of First Principal Component with Variable	
Variable	**Husbands**	**Wives**
Male Primary?	.70566	.70472
Children Suffer?	.69944	.69837
Spouses Equal?	.11327	.12510
Variance Explained	50.1%	49.7%

Table 3: Variable Means by Migrant Status and Household Type								
	by Migrant Status				by Household Type			
Variable Name	**Movers**		**Stayers**		**Progressive**		**Not Progressive**	
Mover?	100.0%		0.0%		13.5%		9.8%	
Progressive Family?	41.7%		33.2%		100.0%		0.0%	
Metro?	74.1%		70.7%		74.8%		69.1%	
Own?	62.3%		79.5%		77.2%		77.8%	
Young Child?	40.4%		31.6%		37.1%		30.3%	
Old Child?	17.3%		28.8%		26.6%		28.0%	
Moved?	55.2%		36.5%		36.4%		39.7%	
Minority?	11.1%		17.8%		15.1%		18.1%	
Disability?	3.1%		4.8%		3.8%		5.0%	
Average Age	36.3 years		40.2 years		36.3 years		41.6 years	
Husband College?	37.0%		25.0%		37.2%		20.7%	
Wife College?	15.7%		10.2%		16.8%		7.8%	
Husband Employed?	88.9%		87.7%		93.4%		84.9%	
Wife Employed?	63.9%		68.5%		83.5%		59.9%	
Husband Desires Work?	9.0%		9.2%		5.4%		11.1%	
Wife Desires Work?	24.7%		19.8%		13.1%		24.1%	
Gender Role Beliefs								
	Husband	**Wife**	**Husband**	**Wife**	**Husband**	**Wife**	**Husband**	**Wife**
Male Primary?	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.8	3.6	3.8	2.1	2.3
Children Suffer?	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.9	3.5	3.8	2.1	2.5
Spouses Equal?	4.1	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.2
n	**324**		**2,609**		**1,000**		**1,933**	

Table 4: Probit Models of Probability of Moving*				
	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Variables	**Parameter**	**P>|z|**	**Parameter**	**P>|z|**
Metro?	0.0152	0.203	0.0144	0.226
Own?	-0.0752	0.000	-0.0758	0.000
Young Child?	-0.0238	0.080	-0.0226	0.096
Old Child?	-0.0530	0.000	-0.0516	0.000
Moved?	0.0841	0.000	0.0840	0.000
Minority?	-0.0410	0.004	-0.0415	0.004
Disability?	-0.0226	0.385	-0.0221	0.395
Average Age	-0.0029	0.000	-0.0028	0.000
Husband College?	0.0444	0.001	0.0417	0.002
Wife College?	0.0128	0.473	0.0114	0.520
Husband Employed?	-0.0257	0.205	-0.0365	0.121
Wife Employed?	-0.0240	0.054	-0.0153	0.299
Progressive?			0.0250	0.558
Progressive and Husband Employed?			0.0335	0.432
Progressive and Wife Employed?			-0.0401	0.094
Predicted Intercept	0.0928		0.0922	
$P>\|X^2\|$	0.000		0.000	
Pseudo R^2	0.083		0.086	

*note all parameters are in terms of probabilities

Table 5: Predictions and Hypothesis Tests				
	Progressive		**Not Progressive**	
	Employed	**Unemployed**	**Employed**	**Unemployed**
Predicted Probability of Moving	7.4%***	13.7%***	9.1%***	7.2%***
Difference within Family Type	-6.3%***		1.9%	
Difference in the Difference between Family Type	-8.2%*			

***** P>|z| < 0.01**
**** 0.01 < P>|z| < 0.05**
**** 0.05 < P>|z| < 0.10**

Table 6: Probit Models of Probability of Moving*				
	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Variables	**Parameter**	**P>|z|**	**Parameter**	**P>|z|**
Metro?	0.0150	0.210	0.0144	0.225
Own?	-0.0763	0.000	-0.0769	0.000
Young Child?	-0.0216	0.108	-0.0205	0.125
Old Child?	-0.0543	0.000	0.0532	0.000
Moved?	0.0847	0.000	0.0848	0.000
Minority?	-0.0420	0.003	-0.0424	0.003
Disability?	-0.0212	0.418	-0.0206	0.431
Average Age	-0.0026	0.000	-0.0025	0.000
Husband College?	0.0432	0.001	0.0405	0.003
Wife College?	0.0122	0.494	0.0112	0.529
Husband Desires Work?	0.0212	0.315	0.0355	0.148
Wife Desires Work?	0.0282	0.042	0.0116	0.472
Progressive?			0.0112	0.392
Progressive and Husband Desires Work?			-0.0376	0.320
Progressive and Wife Desires Work?			0.0688	0.042
Predicted Intercept	0.0928		0.0922	
P>|X^2|	0.000		0.000	
Pseudo R^2	0.082		0.086	

*note all parameters are in terms of probabilities

Table 7: Predictions and Hypothesis Tests				
	Progressive		**Not Progressive**	
	Unemployed, Desires Work	**Other**	**Unemployed, Desires Work**	**Other**
Predicted Probability of Moving	18.3%***	9.5%***	9.4%***	8.4%***
Difference within Family Type	8.9%***		1.1%	
Difference in the Difference between Family Type	7.8%**			

***** P>|z| < 0.01**
**** 0.01 < P>|z| < 0.05**
**** 0.05 < P>|z| < 0.10**

Table 8: Probit Models of Probability of Moving*				
	Model 1		**Model 2**	
Variables	**Parameter**	**P>|z|**	**Parameter**	**P>|z|**
Metro?	0.0151	0.206	0.0144	0.224
Own?	-0.0750	0.000	-0.0756	0.000
Young Child?	-0.0230	0.091	-0.0222	0.101
Old Child?	-0.0529	0.000	-0.0519	0.000
Moved?	0.0847	0.000	0.0850	0.000
Minority?	-0.0415	0.004	-0.0417	0.004
Disability?	-0.0224	0.388	-0.0222	0.392
Average Age	-0.0029	0.000	-0.0027	0.000
Husband College?	0.0446	0.001	0.0416	0.002
Wife College?	0.0125	0.484	0.0116	0.515
Husband Employed?	-0.0412	0.317	-0.0271	0.545
Wife Employed?	-0.0109	0.554	-0.0147	0.465
Husband Desires Work?	-0.0135	0.712	0.0095	0.832
Wife Desires Work?	0.0187	0.361	0.0007	0.974
Progressive?			0.0635	0.498
Progressive and Husband Desires Work?			-0.0604	0.435
Progressive and Wife Desires Work?			0.0212	0.713
Progressive and Husband Desires Work?			-0.0701	0.241
Progressive and Wife Desires Work?			0.0943	0.215
Predicted Intercept	0.0927		0.0919	
$P>\|X^2\|$	0.000		0.000	
Pseudo R^2	0.083		0.087	

*note all parameters are in terms of probabilities

Table 9: Predictions and Hypothesis Tests				
	Progressive		**Not Progressive**	
	Unemployed, Desires Work	**Employed**	**Unemployed, Desires Work**	**Employed**
Predicted Probability of Moving	26.0%***	14.6%***	7.4%***	6.2%***
Difference within Family Type	11.5%***		1.2%	
Difference in the Difference between Family Type	10.3%*			

***** P>|z| < 0.01**
**** 0.01 < P>|z| < 0.05**
**** 0.05 < P>|z| < 0.10**